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Reviewed by John P. Burgess, Princeton University, and Jack Woods, Bilkent 
University 
The core of Ian RumfittÕs new book, long in the making, is a suite of six chapters 
defending classical logic (mainly of negation, conjunction, and disjunction, with 
asides on conditionals, but with quantification deferred) against five lines of 
criticism. These are preceded by a short introduction and two chapters 
expounding the distinctive conception of logic underlying the five case studies, 
and followed by a conclusion concerned with the common theme of the five 
defenses, the separability of classical logic from the principle of bivalence. The 
work is a tribute to the continuing influence of the late Sir Michael Dummett, 
whose student Rumfitt was. Rumfitt repeatedly returns to DummettÕs writings as 
his starting point, though he virtually never ends up accepting DummettÕs 
conclusions. Dummettian influence is shown especially in the fact that, except for 
one chapter mainly on quantum logic, the rival to classical logic considered 
throughout is intuitionistic logic. 
Classical and intuitionistic logics are indeed arguably the only logics in which (to 
adapt a memorable phrase of Solomon Feferman) anything like sustained 
ordinary reasoning can be carried on, as witness the fact that professed 
adherents of other logics generally use one or the other of these, and not their 
preferred logics, in their metatheoretical work. (Rumfitt does argue that quantum 
logicians have an excuse for this procedure, which otherwise makes it look as if 
the deviant logicians only pretend to believe in their deviations.) Rumfitt himself is 
admirably careful in keeping track of which of his own metatheoretic discussions 
rely on distinctively classical principles and which should be intuitionistically 
acceptable. In fact, his use of intuitionistic logic in his metatheory demonstrates 
that there is common ground where intuitionists and classical logicians can 
dispute about which logic is correct without running into the well-known problems 
arising from interpreting intutionistic logic classically. This is a nice result. 
The book is dense with material, including digressions into side issues, invariably 
intriguing if not always compelling, of which no note can be taken in a short 
review. No book of reasonable size on an important subject can go into all 
relevant background material, and the main background missing here is any 
discussion of what is meant by semantics. The term, though of frequent 
appearance in the text, is not even listed in the index. It was coined in the late 
nineteenth century as the label for a linguistic theory of meanings, but, curiously, 
came in the mid-twentieth century to be used for a mathematical theory of 
models, and is now used in both conflicting senses, often without clearly 
distinguishing the two. RumfittÕs understanding of the term, which has to be 
guessed from his usage, evidently takes semantics to have to do with meaning, 
or with sense (which he defines as the logically relevant part of content, content 
itself being undefined), though he does not show the linguistÕs characteristic 
concern with issues of psychological reality, and allows himself considerable 
apparatus of a kind hard to imagine being directly represented in the mind or 
brain. Classical semantics Rumfitt does define, as consisting of the principles 
that every statement is either true or false (bivalence) and none both, plus the 
truth-principles for the individual particles (if A is true, not-A is false; if A is false, 
not-A is true; and so on). 
The second and third chapters present RumfittÕs conception of logic (heavily 
influenced by Dana Scott). In mathematics the ideal is often advocated that every 
step of argumentation should follow logically from steps previously admitted and 
ultimately from postulates acknowledged in advance, even though it has perhaps 
only recently become feasible to realize this ideal with aid from automated proof 
assistants. Rumfitt, by contrast, thinks that there is a genuine notion of 
mathematical deducibility in which the arguments actually given by 
mathematicians can be considered genuine deductions, not enthymemes with 
suppressed premises. Or rather, there are supposed to be various notions of 
algebraic, geometric, and other kinds of mathematical deducibility, and 
nonmathematical deducibility relations as well. Logic, on RumfittÕs conception, is 
concerned with general laws common to all deducibility relations (reflexivity, 
monotonicity, and a generalized form of transitivity) as well as laws for particular 
logical particles articulating how deductions involving them can be spliced 
together (an example being the introduction rule for disjunction: if C is deducible 
in whatever sense from A, and deducible in the same sense from B, then it is 
deducible from A-or-B). Every deducibility relation can be understood in terms of 
a corresponding notion of possibilities (for the cognoscenti, related to it by the 
Lindenbaum-Scott theorem). Out of all this emerges a conception of logical 
deducibility and logical possibilities as the extreme case.   
The alternatives to classical semantics that Rumfitt considers all build on a notion 
of truth at a possibility. Possibilities, like what are elsewhere called situations, are 
not assumed maximally specific or determinate, unlike worlds.The crucial 
structural relation among possibilities is the relation x ≤ y, assumed to be a partial 
order, of y being a further specification or determination of x, meaning that 
anything true at x is true at y. The main task undertaken in elaborating a 
semantics is to provide definitions of the collection |A| of possibilities at which a 
statement A is true such that |not-A| and |A and B| and |A or B| are specifiable in 
terms of |A|, |B|, and the relation ≤. The definitions listed in different forms at 
several places (compare p.119 and p.229, correcting the obvious misprint in the 
disjunction case in the latter) will not, when the different notations are unpacked, 
much surprise the reader familiar with various kinds of formal models elaborated 
in the literature in other context. Except in one regard: The definition of ≤ as given 
quantifies over all statements, while |not-A|, for instance, is defined as the set of 
possibilities which are individually incompatible with every member of |A|, and 
incompatibility is defined in terms of ≤; the extension of |not-A| thus may depend 
on the distribution of truth and falsity to various molecular sentences, including 
not-A itself, over the space of possibilities. Such potential circularity or 
impredicativity might seem worrisome. Could it be avoided, perhaps by replacing 
≤ with its restriction to atomic statements in the definition of incompatibility and 
deriving the current definition of ≤ as a lemma? Putting this aside, the most 
interesting point is that which logic is validated depends not only on these 
definitions and the structural assumptions about ≤, but also on which 
subcollections of the collection of all possibilities are taken to be available to 
serve as |A| for a statement A. In particular, if we have a set-up that validates 
intuitionistic logic, requiring |A|=|not-B|, for some B, immediately implies by 
double application that |A|=|not-not-C| for some C, from which it is a short step, 
reproducing the reasoning of the double-negation interpretation of classical in 
intuitionistic logic, to the conclusion that classical logic is validated. 
There is only space to take brief note of the specifics of the five case studies, 
each of which can be expected to generate considerable discussion. Chapter 4 
concerns an argument in DummettÕs early paper "Truth", a flimsy thing, which 
Dummett was not long in abandoning and which Rumfitt is not long in 
demolishing, but which serves as a peg on which to hang an interesting 
discussion of an exclusionary view of content (a statement is understood by 
understanding which possibilities it rules out, not which possibilities it rules in). 
Chapters 5 and 6 take off from the famous Dummetiian verificationist attack on 
the use of classical logic, in the first instance in mathematics. To some of us it 
has long been apparent that this could not generalize to a case for intuitionistic 
logic across the board, since in connection with empirical matters one would 
have to take into account (1) that ÒverificationÓ in general at most establishes 
defeasible presumption, and (2) performing the operations needed to ÒverifyÓ one 
statement might preclude performing those needed for another, so that features 
of (1) nonmonotonic and (2) quantum logic could be expected to be required. 
Rumfitt especially presses the complaint that no strong case has been made for 
replacing necessary truth-preservation by warrant-preservation as the criterion of 
deductive validity. The discussion leads into chapter 6, which takes up quantum 
logic, and so perhaps inevitably becomes the most technical. In particular, a 
structural requirement on ≤ that is highly technical, but said to reflect the 
monotonicity of deducibility, is introduced, and invoked in connection with 
distributivity, the main area of classical-quantum conflict. It might have been 
interesting if Rumfitt had related his approach here to the well-known work of 
Randall and Foulis, which purports to derive something formally like quantum 
logic from verificationist principles, without bringing in microphysics specifically. 
Chapter 7 turns to a third complaint, the traditional intuitionist claim that the 
mathematical infinite requires a different logic from the classical. It is here that 
the matters pertaining to the double negation interpretation alluded to above are 
brought in, and connected with the exclusionary conception from an earlier 
chapter. Chapter 8 concerns a fourth complaint, concerning vagueness, 
specifically of the chromatic kind, starting from Crispin WrightÕs suggestion that 
intuitionistic logic may help with the sorites paradox. Rumfitt thinks it doesnÕt, and 
offers instead a classical solution based on his distinctive semantics, heavily 
stressing that it allows ÒA-1 or A-2 or É or A-100Ó to be true without any ÒA-nÓ 
being true. Chapter 9 takes very seriously William TaitÕs version of the frequently-
made suggestion that quantification over arbitrary sets must be considered to be 
governed by intuitionistic and not classical logic, in which that conclusion is 
presented as somehow following from the fact that no complete axiomatization of 
set theory is available.  
Rumfitt, after examining all sorts of technical results and philosophical 
commentary thereupon, doesnÕt ultimately defend the combination of classical 
logic and classical set theory. This is not surprising, since he doesnÕt question the 
most contentious presupposition of the kind of skepticism he is examining. He 
wants simultaneously to accept as a premise (p.265) that mathematics does not 
describe a realm of reality wholly independent of human thought, while denying 
that this view implies that the number two did not exist before there were thinkers 
of capable of doing elementary arithmetic (p.264). This is sustainable if one takes 
it that the part of the mathematical realm to which the number two belongs is 
wholly independent of human thought, while some other parts are not, including 
presumably, the part containing large cardinals, say. But this combination of 
views still leaves one committed to saying that the existence of large cardinals, at 
least, is partly dependent on human thought, in which case they couldnÕt have 
existed before there were human thinkers. And so it leaves one still committed to 
saying that it makes sense in some cases to speak of mathematical objects as 
existing at one time and not at another. If one takes it that what is dependent on 
human thought, and wholly so, is set theory, but that the rules human thought 
establishes for set theory, for speaking within the theory of sets rather than 
speaking of set theory from outside, preclude significant application of tense 
distinctions to set-existence statements, then the whole skeptical line of thought 
will appear a muddle, a confusion of two levels of language, of a kind Rudolf 
Carnap exposed long ago.  
RumfittÕs concessive stance on classical set theory also suggests an overarching 
question about his defense of classical logic. Since logical possibility is supposed 
to be the limiting case of possibility, and since in several of the cases considered, 
adding an additional, if plausible, constraint can be shown (intuitionistically) to 
vindicate classical logic, what rules out holding that the broadest notion of logical 
consequence, and hence logical possibilities, is intuitionistic, but that in a great 
many cases we are well justified in focusing on a subset of the logical 
possibilitiesÑthose obeying, |A|=|not-B|, for some B, sayÑwhich vindicates 
classical logic? Such a dish strikes us as unpalatable, but it would be desirable to 
have a more principled reason for taking it off the menu. But rather than take the 
foregoing comments as criticism, let them be taken as an indication of how much 
Rumfitt leaves us to discuss, and how provocative his own discussions can be. 
